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JUDICIAL COURAGE AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Penny J. White*
For lots of years I have had the opportunity to participate in and
plan continuing education programs for educators, advocates, and
jurists. I think, quite frankly, that I have never been associated with one
of such an outstanding caliber as this 1996 Annual Conference of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges.
I commend each of you for your presence and participation here
and I congratulate Judge Young and Judge Harwick and the other
Conference members responsible for their leadership in organizing this
challenging, provocative program for you. I am proud -- very proud -to have the opportunity to share some time with you and be a very small
part of this endeavor.
What impresses me about your program is the difficult nature
of the many topics you are tackling -- evaluation of judges, ex parte
communications, discrimination and bias, pro se litigants.
There is, of course, a bigger picture, a forest, if you will among
the many trees of themes you'll be thinking about for the next four days.
It is the common thread that motivates you to address each of these
issues. That common thread that connects all these issues is their
contribution to, their role in meeting, the essential, yet illusive
challenge of Equal Justice Under the Law -- the Theme of your 1996
Conference.
And so it is, for example, that you will discuss ex parte
communications assuring that justice is not influenced by unethical
contact. You will address pro se litigation, assuring that justice is not
determined by wealth; as well as discrimination and bias, assuring that
justice does not depend upon race or gender.
All are important - all contribute to equal justice, we know,
because we know that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.
But I am here today to nobly proclaim without apology that the

*Former Justice, Tennessee Supreme Court, speech delivered at National
Administrative Law Judges' Conference, November 9, 1996, Nashville, TN.
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greatest impediment to meeting the challenge of equal justice under the
law is none of these. The greatest impediment, indeed the greatest
obstacle to fulfilling that promise, a promise prominently chiseled over
the entrance to the United States Supreme Court, penned in documents
which breathed life into this nation,' recited by citizens vowing their
allegiance to this country, the greatest threat to meeting the promise of
equal justice under the law is the erosion of the independence of the
judiciary. And that erosion is hastened most quickly by judicial
timidity.
I suggest to you that judicial independence is the sine qua non
of due process, of equal protection, and of equal justice under the law.
I cannot claim any credit for this assertion. It did not come to
me as a post-election realization. It precedes me and all of us by
centuries.3
And interestingly enough, one of the first pronouncements of
the principle ofjudicial independence was indeed an administrative law
case. In 1610, in the case of Dr. Bonham, a graduate of Cambridge
University brought suit against the Board of Censors of the Royal
College of Physicians. The doctor was imprisoned for failing to
submit to competency tests. A statute authorized the Board upon a
finding of incompetency, to imprison and fine the doctor. One half of
4
the fine would go to the college.
The jurist in the case, none other than Lord Coke, Chief Justice
of the King's Bench, found that the Board had a vested financial interest
in the case and could not act as factfinder. The principle espoused:
NEMO JUDEX IN RE SUA, "no man may be a judge in his own

IPreamble to the Declaration of Independence; United States Constitution,
amend. V; amend. VIX.
2tI pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America..

with liberty

and justice for all." Pledge of Allegiance.

3 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF ENGLAND 121-23, 150, 190-91 (1965); COLIN R. LOVELL, ENGLISH

OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, 333-35 (1962) 2 W. HOLDSWORTII, HISTORY
THE
IN
OFFICER
JUDICIAL
"THE
PARKER,
JOHN
ENGLISH LAW 195 (7th ed. 1956); JUDGE

20 TENN. L. REV. 703, 705-06 (1949).
UNITED STATES,"
4
Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 8 Coke I 14(a)(C.P. 1610).
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5
cause," was fundamental to the early common law. Ironically Lord
Coke was removed from office by James I for failing to rule in
accordance with James' wishes.6
History demonstrates that the other branches of government,
Parliament and the King, did not willingly accept the proposition that
judges were not subject to their control. Judges were induced to rule in
accord with the desires of the King, who would remove them if they did

not, or in accordance with Parliament's predispositions, who would
decrease or eliminate their salary otherwise.7

Finally, in 1688, the Glorious Revolution led to the deposing of
King James II and the appointment of judges for periods of good
behavior rather than "at the King's pleasure."8 As a corollary, their
salaries were fixed by Parliament.9
The British weren't the only people to revolt over the attempts
to eliminate the independence of judicial officers.

"We hold these truths to be self evidence; that all people are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain

inalienable rights, that among those are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted...,
that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends," destructive of these ends, I repeat, "it is the right of the people
to alter or abolish it and institute new government."1 °
5

Id. at 648, 8 Coke at 118(b); see M. Redish & L. Marshall, "Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process," 95 YALE LAW JOURNAL 455,
479 (1986 .
WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,

1621-1628, 6-7. (1979). SFE ALSO 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 509-14
(James II did the same thing); COLIN R. LOVELL, supa, at note 3.
(2d ed. 1924)
7
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, sura note 3.
81 W. HOLDSWORTH, sulr note 3.
9
Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will.ll1 ch. 2, section 3(1701)(Eng.). Act of I
George III, 1 George. 3, ch. 23 (1760)(Eng.). In 1907 John Zane wrote, "Since the
Glorious Revolution there has never been a removal of a judge by the executive power, nor
a single known instance of a corrupt decision." See, John Nancy Zane, "The Five Ages of
the Bench and Bar of England," in I SELECT ESSAYS INANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY,
625, (1907), quoted in Berman, The Transformation of English Legal Sciences; From Hale
45 EMORY L.J.. 437, 507 (1996).
to Blackstone,
10
Preamble to the Declaration of Independence.
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Those words are familiar to us all. We memorized them in
grammar school and we can still remember them. But do we remember
the words that follow?
In the following words, the patriots declared George III a
tyrant! The accusation was not a hollow one. The authors of the
Declaration, many of them lawyers, did not rest on hollow, emotive
accusations. They supported their harsh accusation with facts:
"Let facts be submitted to a candid world, "they said." Today
we would say , "Here's the proof. You judge the accusation for
yourself." Then the authors carefully, meticulously charted the long list,
twenty-seven paragraphs of the transgressions, the tyrannous acts of the
King.
Prominently placed, in the Top Ten, in paragraphs seven and
eight, was this declaration:
"He has obstructed the administration of justice . . . , He has
made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries."2
I submit that it would do us good to memorize that. I submit
that it is important, no, it is crucial, that those who hold or desire the
title ofjudge, justice, your honor, that every single person who desires
to don the robe, aptly described as both "an emancipating and humbling
act,"that those who undertake to judge must be constantly mindful of
the fact that paramount among the acts that led to the American
Revolution, and ultimately, to the establishment of an independent
United States of America were the efforts by the other branches of
government to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
That we must remember, if we desire to meet the challenge of
equal justice under the law; that we must never forget.
It comes as no surprise then that the requirement of an
independent judiciary was integrated soundly into the Constitution and
into the jurisprudence of the new nation. 3 Chief Justice John Marshall
declared, that, "I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now,
that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an

12
Declaration
3

of Independence.
1 U.S. Constitution, Art III, Marbury v. Madisgn, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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ungrateful and sinning people was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a
dependent Judiciary." 4
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers "feared complacence to the
branch which controls the judicial officer."' 5 He expressed concern that
the judicial officer would not "hazard the displeasure of those who
controlled."' 6
Remove the formal, poetic language of the old English tongue,
and the message remains the same. Those who undertake to resolve
disputes between citizens, corporations, or government cannot answer
to any one; cannot allow control, real or imagined, to influence their
decisions; cannot allow the public to believe or even perceive that the
decision maker owes allegiance to one side or the other.
Though ancient, judicial independence is not obsolete. It is as
necessary, as essential today as it was when Dr. Bonham was
imprisoned by the Cambridge University Censors. This theme is
nowhere more obvious than in the very Acts which gave rise to many
of your positions.
The federal and model state administrative procedures acts, half
a century old this year, were largely prompted by concerns for
uniformity in administrative procedures. 7 Central to those acts, and to
their adoption, were the concerns that procedural guarantees be
adequately enforced and the belief that enforcement would help ensure
an accurate, fair decision. 8 I suggest to you that a myriad of procedural
guarantees: notice, hearing, counsel, witness exam is rendered
completely meaningless if the adjudicator of those rights is robbed of
14John Marshall's speech to the Virginia Convention during the debate on the

Constitution is quoted by Judge John Parker at 20 TENN. L. REV. 706 (1949), sura note 3,
but is unfortunately not cited.
15The Federalist No. 78, at 503-509 (A. flamilton)(E. Earle ed. 1937).
16Id.
7

Code Ann. Sections 4-5-101 gt s..; 5 U.S.C.§ 551 et seq.
See, ROBINSON, GELLHORN AND BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 4TH
ED. 36-40 (1993); W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINg 43 (1941). "The
problem is to develop methods which give assurances that matters will receive full and fair
administrative consideration, so that the determinations when made will not be "arbitrary,"
but will reflect wise and informed deliberation" quoted in GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (7th ed. 1979) at 10-11.
I1ee generally Tenn.
18
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9
judicial independence or devoid of judicial courage.' Procedural
safeguards are irrelevant if the adjudicator bases findings on factors
other than the evidence or if the adjudicator is an integral part of the
20
party on the other side of the case.
Moreover, the concern is not only in those rare situations in
which independence is in reality compromised, it is in those situations
in which it appears to be compromised as well. Justice is as it is
perceived. We must not only do justice, we must be perceived as doing
it. We must satisfy justice and we must satisfy the appearance of
justice. As Judge John Parker said: "It is of supreme importance, not
only that justice be done, but that the litigants before the court and the
public generally understand that it is being done ..."'
And so we have journeyed through history, quoted the
Declaration of Independence, remembered great patriots, great writers,
great judges, maybe felt a twinge or two of patriotism. Is this anything
more? Is it more than a patriotic journey down memory lane, more than
an exercise in waving the flag?
You bet it is. I began by telling you that a dependent judiciary
is the greatest threat to equal justice under the law. It is more, ladies
and gentlemen, it is a great threat to our entire system of justice, and I
suggest, to our democracy.
But there is still more. I've talked about this subject with state
court judges, about how judges must not bow to political pressure, to
the untested will of the people. We remember all too many times when
the people were wrong: slavery, debtors' prisons, segregation, gender
discrimination. We are aware that while the public demands equal
protection of the laws, their demands are silent, or stifled at best, for
those whom the public scorns. And we know that at one time or
another the public has scorned minorities, working women, Jews, the
disabled, farmers. We know that almost all of us have at one time or
another been the object of the public's scorn.
And so I have encouraged those judges and the advocates that
stand before them as I encourage you this morning to be courageous

19

M. REDISH & L. MARSHALL,

aU=

note 5, at 491-95.

20 N
21

Judge John Parker, supra note 3, at 20 TENN. L. REV. 706.
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and relentless in defense of judicial independence.
The courage and perseverance demanded of you, of those of you
who sit in the state and federal administrative tribunals is greater than
those who judge elsewhere. Federal judges are protected by life tenure,
and while our brothers and sisters on the state bench do not have that
luxury, they are often insulated from real decision making by juries.
That is a buffer that each of you is without.
You hear the case, you determine the facts, you apply the law,
you render the decision. You have no guarantee of continued
employment; you have no partners on the bench. As a result, you make
more decisions, see more people, touch more lives. In short, you have
more opportunity, and I suggest, more obligation to demonstrate
judicial courage and judicial independence in action.
Secondly, your many decisions affect a wide variety of issues,
many of which form the core of those values that prompted the
revolution: the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Your
decisions impact labor, housing, employment, human rights,
transportation, mental health, the environment, the core of every
person's existence. There is no more essential place for the exercise
of judicial courage, for the demonstration of judicial independence than
in the administrative tribunals of this country where issues at the heart
of the values we hold most dear are determined. There is no more
essential person to demonstrate that courage, to exercise that
independence than you and you and you.
Thirdly, and most unfortunately, as a result of the usual nexus
between you and parties who routinely appear before you, you are
unfairly perceived as the least likely decision maker to exercise judicial
independence. Your necessary entanglement with those who appear in
cases you decide leads to a natural inference that independence will be
sacrificed in favor of protecting most usually, the government's
interest, or government coffers.
That perception, though unwarranted, must be recognized first,
and then eliminated. "In a government of laws," said Justice Brandeis,
"government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If
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government becomes a law breaker,, it breeds contempt for law, it
22
invites everyman to become a law unto himself; It invites anarchy."
You must be the example of law fairly, equally, independently,
courageously applied. The determination of the facts and the
application of the law, is your exclusive province. No one and nothing
should be allowed to influence that determination.
You must do justice, of course, but you must do more than that.
You must create, perpetuate, a perception ofjustice being done. As you
personify courage and independence, you plant the seeds for public
confidence and public trust in our system of law and you become a
torchbearer, an ambassador for that which motivated most of us to enter
this profession-- the fulfillment of America's promise of equal justice
under the law.

22

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).

